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CASES TO WATCH
by Alyse Hakami
Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICIAmeri-
cas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cr. 1994),
petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.LW. 22 (U.S.
Nov. 10, 1994) (No. 94-841).
The Arkansas Wildlife Federation (AWF)
filed a citizen's suit against ICI Americas, Inc.
(ICI), a herbicide manufacturing plant, under
the Clean Water Act which alleged that ICI
was in violation of its pollution discharge
permit. Both the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas and the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
AWF's petition was jurisdictionally barred
under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) which
disallows a citizen suit where a state has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an
action in a state administrative proceeding
that is comparable to a federal proceeding.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the District Court's finding that (1) the Arkan-
sas Department of Pollution Control and
Ecology (ADPC & E) "commenced" a state
proceeding by issuing a consent administra-
tive order (CAO); (2) under the facts of this
case the ADPC &Ewas diligently prosecuting
the administrative action against ICI; and (3)
Arkansas law is comparable to 33 U.S.C. §
1319(g) because it contains comparable pen-
alty provisions which the state may enforce,
has the same general enforcement goals as
the federal statute, allows interested parties to
be involved at significant stages in the deci-
sion-making process, and adequately pro-
tects the legitimate interests of these inter-
ested parties. In addition, the Eighth Orcuit
held that it would be unreasonable to preclude
citizens' suits for civil penalties but not to
preclude claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief. Therefore, AWF could not bring its
claim against ICI for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief since AWF's claims for civil penal-
ties were jurisdictionally barred by the Arkan-
sas state administrative action even though
the federal statute only refers to the preclusion
of civil penalty actions.
AWF's appeal from the Eighth Crcuit de-
cision presents two issues. The first is whether
the Arkansas administrative penalty order
bars AWF's claim for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief in light of federal statutory language
which states that the commencement of state
law administrative proceedings only precludes
civil penalty actions. The second issue on
appeal is whether the Arkansas administra-
tive penalty order precludes AWF's suit for
civil damages when a state's procedures for
public participation and penalty assessment
are not comparable to federal procedure for
imposing administrative penalties. AWF filed
a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court on November 10, 1994.
Kelleyv. EnvironmentalProtection Agency
15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), petition for
cert. filed, 63 U.S.LW. 21 (U.S. Oct. 26,
1994) (No. 94-752).
The State of Michigan and the Chemical
Manufacturers Association filed suit against
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to reviewtheEPA's regulation regarding lender
liability under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and labil-
ity Act (CERCLA). This regulation attempts to
provide a standard for determining when a
lender's participation in the management of a
facility causes it to lose its secured creditor
exemption under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
Petitioners claimed that the EPA lacked statu-
tory authority to promulgate a regulation that
defines lender liability, and that only the
federal courts have such authority to define
the scope of lender liability under CERCLA.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Congress has designated
the courts as the "adjudicator of the scope of
CERCLA liability since Congress provided for
private causes of action under CERCLA §
107." Because the court is the first body to
determine liability, the EPA lacks authority to
issue substantive regulations which interpret
a statute establishing liability. In addition, the
court held that the EPA's regulation was not
interpretive in nature, which would normally
entitle it to judicial deference, but rather the
regulation was a quasi-legislative attempt to
implement CERCLA's liability provisions re-
garding secured creditors. Finally, citingAdams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990), the
court found that under the standard set forth
in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
agency interpretation of statutes will be given
judicial deference only when there is a con-
gressional delegation of administrative au-
thority. Deference is also inappropriate if
Congress instead merelyauthorizes theagency
to bring the action in federal court as prosecu-
tor. Lastly, regardless of whether the agency
has authority to interpret a statute, there will
not be judicial deference if a private party is
able to bring an independent private cause of
action in federal court. Because the petition-
ers in this case are such private parties, the
court found judicial deference to the EPA's
regulation defining lender liability inappropri-
ate and vacated the regulation.
The first issue on appeal is whether the
court of appeals erred in vacating the EPA
regulation and disregarding EPA rulemaking
authority under CERCLA when it ruled that
the EPA was not allowed to issue regulations
relating to CERCLA liability issues. Secondly,
did the court of appeals err in its interpreta-
tion of Chevron v. N.R.D.C. andAdams Fruit
v. Barrett relating to the scope of judicial
deference to agency regulation.
Petition for certiorari was filed with the United
States Supreme Court on October 26, 1994.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for
a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463
(D.C. Or. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63
U.S.LW. 23 (Nov. 10, 1994) (No. 94-859),
petition for cert. granted, 115 S.Ct. 714
(1995).
A group of non-profit and other organiza-
tions dependent upon the forest products
industry (Sweet Home) filed a petition against
the Secretary of the Interior after the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) promulgated certain
regulations under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA) which prohibits the taking of an
endangered species. Under the ESA, the
term "take" includes causing harm or at-
tempted harm to an endangered species.
Sweet Home argued that these regulations,
which define the term "harm" to include
significant habitat modification or degrada-
tion, violate the ESA because there was no
showing that Congress intended to include
habitat modification or degradation within
the context of the taking of an endangered
species. The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia upheld the FWS's
interpretation of thescopeof theterm "harm"
under the ESA. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and held that the FWS
regulation defining the scope of "take" was
invalid in that this interpretation was not
clearly authorized by Congress. In addition,
the court found that the regulation was not a
reasonable interpretation of the ESA.
The issue on appeal is whether the FWS
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of
the Interior under the ESA which interprets
the term "harm" to include significant habitat
modification or degradation is valid in light of
Congressional intentbehind the enactment of
the ESA. Petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court was filed on November





YellowFreight System, Inc. v. ACFIndus-
fries, Inc., No. 64779, 1994 WL 270409
(Mo. Ct. App. June 21, 1994).
Yellow Freight System, Inc. (Yellow
Freight) sued ACF Industries (ACF) in federal
court for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et.
seq., 42 U.S.C. § 6972, and common law
strict liability and contribution. Yellow Freight
alleged that it had purchased a contaminated
plot of land from ACF and that it was entitled
to recover cleanup costs. In a related action
for declaratory relief in state court, Yellow
Freight claimed it had a private right of
action based on the Missouri Hazardous
Substance Emergency Statute (Mo. REv.
STAT. §§ 260.500 through 260.550). The
trial court held that the Missouri Substance
Emergency Statute does not create a private
cause of action, and the appellate court
affirmed.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.530 states that a
"person having control over a hazardous
substance is strictly liable to the State of
Missouri for the reasonable cleanup costs
incurred by the state." Both parties agreed
that the legislature did not expressly provide
for a private cause of action, but Yellow
Freight pointed out that "cleanup costs," as
defined in § 260.530.1 Mo. REv. STAT.
1986, include "all costs incurred by the state
... or by any other person operating with the
approval of the department of natural re-
sources." The appellate court interpreted
the language to mean only that the state can
recover costs when it hires contractors to
help with the cleanup.
Yellow Freight also claimed that the defi-
nition of a "person having control of a
hazardous substance" applied only to ACF,
and that Yellow Freight was protected as a
buyer of the property. The court held that
Yellow Freight was not protected because
the there was no indication that the statute
intended protection for a defined class. The
court said the statute was for the benefit of
the "general public", and that Yellow Freight
itself might be held liable under the statute.
The court agreed with Yellow Freight's
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contention that a private right of action
would promote the legislative purposes of
the Substance Emergency Statute by en-
couraging prompt cleanup by non-liable
persons, who could then expect compensa-
tion. However, the court held that when a
legislative act provides for other means of
enforcement, the courts will not recognize a
private cause of action.
- by Kin Semsch
Key Tronic Corporation v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994)
In 1980 Key Tronic, a private corpora-
tion, the Air Force, and various other parties
became involved in a Superfund Cleanup at
the Colbert Landfill in Washington State.
Key Tronic eventually settled with the EPA,
agreeing to provide $4.2 million to aid in the
cleanup of the site. The Air Force also settled
with the EPA for $1.45 million. This action
was brought by Key Tronic, a private corpo-
ration, to recover a portion of its $4.2 million
cleanup costs and its $1.2 million response
costs from other responsible parties. The
$4.2 million contribution claim under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), was dismissed by the
District Court after Key Tronic conceded
that it was precluded from recovering any
part of its cleanup costs under the consent
decree. The $1.2 million cost recovery claim
brought under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(4)(B), included recovery of attorney's
fees under three distinct theories: 1) the
identification of other potentially responsible
parties (PRP's) that were liable forthe cleanup;
2) preparation and negotiation of its agree-
ment with the EPA; and 3) the prosecution
of this litigation.
Courts have differed over the extent to
which a party can recover attorney's fees as
a response cost under CERCLA. The Su-
preme Court, therefore, granted certiorari to
puta final end tothedispute. JusticeStevens,
in writing the majority opinion, held that: 1)
litigation-related attorney fees were not re-
coverable; 2) fees pertaining to activities
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performed in identifying other PRP's were
recoverable; and 3) fees for legal services in
connection with negotiations culminating in
a consent decree with the EPA were not
recoverable. Explicitly guiding the decision
of the Court was the general rule that
attorney's fees are unrecoverable absent
express congressional authorization. Since
CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9607 did not ex-
pressly provide for the recovery of attorney's
fees, the Court was forced to look at the
statute to determine whether it was
Congress's intent to provide for this type of
recovery.
The court examined CERCLA and the
1986 Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act (SARA) in making its deter-
mination. The Court noted that recovery of
attorney's fees in the context of litigation
expenses hinged upon whether "enforce-
ment activities", included in the definition of
"response", were within the scope of a
party's ability to recover the "necessary
costs of response."42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(B).
Key Tronic contended that a private action
for recovery under § 9607 was one of the
enforcement activities covered by that defi-
nition and that attorney's fees should there-
fore be recoverable. The Supreme Court
disagreed.
The Court noted that § 9607 implicitly
authorized an action for private parties to
seek recovery costs. It held that the implicit
nature of the action was not an adequate
expression of Congress's intent to allow for
the recovery of attorney's fees. In the 1986
SARA amendments, the Court noted that
Congress specifically included two provi-
sions for the recovery of attorney's fees. The
Court believed that Congress's failure to
include such a provision for § 9607 strongly
suggested that it did not intend for there to
be one. In addition, the Court felt that the
plain meaning of the phrase "enforcement
activities" did not encompass the type of
recovery at issue in the case. The Court
concluded that CERCLA §107 did not pro-
vide for the recovery of attorney's fees
associated with bringing a cost recovery
action.
The Court emphasized that its holding
with respect to litigation-related expenses
was not meant to imply that all attorney's
fees were unrecoverable under CERCLA §
9607. In fact, the Court went on to state that
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some expenses should rightfully be included
as necessary response costs under §
9607(a)(4)(B). The gist of the Courts analysis
seemed to focus on the connection the
lawyer's work had with the actual site cleanup
and the benefit the work had to the entire
cleanup effort. The Court concluded that the
identification of other potentially responsible
parties served as a means to benefit the
entire site by assuring that the cleanup would
be effective performed and paid for. This,
the Court stated, was an activity that fell
outside the reallocation of costs. Thus, the
Court held that Key Tronic was rightfully
entitled to the costs associated with the
identification of other PRP's as a recovery
expense.
The Court made clear from the onset that
it believed legal services performed in con-
nection with negotiations between KeyTronic
and EPA were unrecoverable. It reasoned
that although studies, surveys, and docu-
ments prepared by Key Tronic could con-
ceivably have aided the EPA in limiting the
scope and type of remedy chosen, the main
purpose of the materials was to aid Key
Tronic in limiting its own liability at the site.
The Court concluded that such materials,
used and prepared primarily for the benefit
of the defendant, could not be considered
"necessary costs of response" under
CERCLA. Therefore, the majority affirmed
in part and reversed in part the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, and remanded the
case for further proceedings consistent with
the opinion.
- by Greg Moldafsky
Employers Insurance of Wausau v. United
States, 27 F.3d 245 (7th Cir. 1994)
The Employers Insurance of Wausau
(Wausau) filed a complaint against the United
States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, and
2671-80. It alleged that the United States,
through the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), committed the torts of mali-
cious prosecution, abuse of process, and
negligence after the EPA ordered Wausau to
clean up hazardous waste materials.
Wausau was the insurance carrier of prop-
erty owned by Group Eight Technology
(Group 8). After Group 8's property caught
fire, Wausau agreed to pay for the damage
caused by the fire plus the cost for the
removal of the debris from the property.
Included in the debris were transformers and
their fluids which contained polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs). After agreeing to a price,
the plaintiff hired K & D Industries Services
(K & D) to perform the removal and disposal
of the transformers and their fluids. After
removal of the fluids, K & D transported
them to an oil recycling facility owned by
ClW Company(CIW). Shortly thereafter, the
EPA discovered that many of CIW's process
tanks were contaminated with PCBs. After
investigating the contamination, the EPA
named Wausau as a "potentially responsible
party" forthe CIW contamination, and there-
fore was responsible for the clean-up of the
CIW site.
The EPA made this liability determination
based on its conclusion that Wausau was
subject to the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
Under CERCLA, the EPA issued an order
demanding Wausau to clean up the CIW
site. Wausau conferred with the EPA and
argued that they were improperly named as
a "potentially responsible party". The EPA,
however, demanded clean-up and subjected
Wausau to immense fines and penalties for
failure to comply with the order. Wausau
eventually performed the clean-up to avoid
the fines imposed by the United States.
Wausau then filed a petition for reimburse-
ment of costs pursuant to CERCLA. The
petition was denied by the EPA. Following
this denial Wausau filed this suit under the
FTCA against the EPA in an attempt to
recover money for the alleged tortious con-
duct.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the previous ruling by the district
court to dismiss the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The court based its ruling
on the interpretation of the FTCA. This act
generally waives federal government sover-
eign immunity and allows the United States
government to be sued by someone who is
injuredduetothe negligence orsome wrong-
ful act by an employee of the United States
while that employee was acting in the scope
of employment. There are several excep-
tions, however, to this general rule under the
FTCA.
As the Seventh Circuit recognized, one
exception to the general rule is the discre-
tionary function exception. The court held
that Wausau could not sue the United States
because of the discretionary function excep-
tion which protects government employees
from tort liability when they make decisions
that involve choice, judgment, or consider-
ations of public policy. The court ruled that
the decision by the EPA ordering Wausau to
clean-up the CIW site was a decision that
involved judgment and considerations of
public policy. The court reasoned that the
United States, under CERCLA, gave the
EPA discretion in arranging for removal and
disposal of hazardous waste. CERCLA al-
lows the EPA to take any remedial action,
such as court orders and penalties, that it
feels necessary to protect the environment
from hazardous substances. Therefore, the
court held that Wausau could not bring suit
against the government even if the EPA did
act negligently since the EPA is immune
from tort liability when it makes discretion-
ary decisions.
- by Christy L. Fisher
United States v. Freter, No. 93-10285,
1994 WL 382631 (9th Cir. July 25, 1994)
Daryl Freter (Freter) appealed his convic-
tion of violating 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3)
which penalizes "any person... in charge of
a facility from which a hazardous substance
is released, other than a federally permitted
release, ... who fails to notify immediately
the appropriate agency." Freter was sen-
tenced to two years of supervised probation
and was fined $2,000.
In the late 1980's, Freter was the man-
ager of an enterprise established to study the
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processing of minerals from ores with the
eventual plan of extracting gold and other
precious metals. Tofacilitate this enterprise,
Freter subleased public lands in California
where he stored approximately twenty bar-
rels of sodium hypochlorite, which is a
hazardous substance underthe Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA). In April
1990, Freter was ordered to leave the prop-
erty because of unpaid rent and utilities.
Freter complied with this order and vacated
the premises, but he abandoned the barrels
of sodium hypochlorite on the property and
failed to notify the appropriate federal agency
of their existence and abandonment In
October 1990, the drums of sodium hy-
pochlorite were discovered by a company
working under contract with Environmental
Protection Agency.
Among the issues the court reviewed on
appeal were 1) whether the government
should have the burden to prove that the
release of a hazardous substance is not a
federally permitted release as an essential
element of the crime, or alternatively 2)
whether the defendant should be required to
assert that the release is federally permitted
as an affirmative defense. Freter argued that
this burden should be on the govemment,
and that it was plain error for the court to
omit this element of the crime from the
instructions given to the jury. The instant
court disagreed and held that because the
range of federally permitted releases is nar-
row, while the prohibition against releases is
broad, it is much less burdensome to require
the defendant to assert as an affirmative
defense that the release was permitted than
to require the government to prove that it
was not permitted. .
The court also addressed Freter's argu-
ment that there was insufficient evidence to
conclude that he had voluntarily abandoned
the sodium hypochlorite because of his
eviction and subsequent lack of access to the
site. The court held that Freter's argument
was without merit as he had not attempted
to contact either the owner of the property
or his other investors in the enterprise to
notify them of the situation so that he could
attempt to gain access to the site and re-
move the chemicals.
Freter argued that there was insufficient
evidence to show that he had failed to report
the release of the hazardous substance to the
National Response Center. After examining
testimony from the previous trial, the court
determined that Freter was aware that the
sodium hypochlorite was a hazardous mate-
rial. Further, Freter had not informed the
National Response Center of its abandon-
ment because he was not aware that "aban-
donment" of the materials constituted a
"release" under the statute. Therefore, the
court held that a rational juror could find that
sufficient evidence existed to prove that he
did not report the release of the substance,
which was an essential element of the
government's claim.
- by Byron Woehlecke
Catellus Development Corporation v.
United States, No. 93-16530, 1994 WL
414537 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 1994)
General Automotive (General) operated
an auto parts store which sold automotive
batteries and also received used batteries on
customer trade-ins. To dispose of these
spent batteries, General sold them to a
battery cracking plant run by Morris P. Kirk
& Sons, Inc. (Kirk). After Kirk extracted and
smelted all of the lead from the batteries, the
left-over casings were crushed by Kirk and
disposed of on the property of Catellus
Development Corporation (Catellus). These
casings contained lead and contaminated
Catellus's property. Catellus sought reversal
of the District Court decision that held Gen-
eral Automotive was not responsible for
clean-up costs of Catellus's property.
Under the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., a
plaintiff may recover from "any person who
by contract, agreement, or otherwise ar-
ranged for disposal or treatment ... of haz-
ardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at
any facility ... owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazard-
ous substances." 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(3).
The court defined disposal as the affirmative
act of discarding the substance as waste,
rather than the productive use of the sub-
stance. Therefore, not only did the court
have to find that General "arranged for the
disposal" of the spent batteries, but the
batteries had to be considered "waste".
General first argued that the spent batter-
ies were not waste because they were being
recycled, and the lead in them would be put
to further productive use. The court held
"waste" to be "any discarded material which
is abandoned ... recycled ... or inherently
wastelike." 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2) (1993).
The court followed United States v. ILCO
Inc.,996 F.2d 1126,1131(11th Cir, 1993),
and concluded that lead components from
the spent batteries was waste.
General then argued that it did not "ar-
range" to dispose of the batteries because it
did not control the eventual disposition of
the batteries. Part of General's argument
relied on the fact that it sold the batteries to
Kirk who then assumed complete owner-
ship and control of the batteries. However,
the court did not require continued owner-
ship or control for determining liability under
CERCLA. The court reasoned that if contin-
ued ownership was a requirement for liabil-
ity, then parties like General who needed to
dispose of a hazardous substance could
simply sell the waste to someone else to
evade liability. The court felt this was against
the policy underlying CERCLA because
parties would then just "close their eyes" to
the method of disposal of their own hazard-
ous substances.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed that General
was not responsible for the clean-up costs
on a different theory from the one used by
the District Court. CERCLA requires that
treatment of the hazardous waste take place
at the facility which is subject to the clean up
effort in order for there to be liability. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). In this case, none of the
treatment of the hazardous waste arranged
for by General took place at Catellus. The
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court thus reversed the District Court deci-
sion and remanded the case for a determina-
tion of General's liability under this theory.
- by Christy Rsher
Long Beach Unified School District v.
DorothyB. Godwin California Living Trust
and Mobil Oil Corporation, Powerine Oil
Co., No. 92-56562, 1994 WL 363066 (9th
Cir. May 4, 1994)
TheAppellant, Long Beach Unified School
District (the district), purchased land from
the Dorothy B. Godwin California Living
Trust and the Grover Godwin California
Trust (the trusts). Prior to the purchase, the
land had been leased to the Schafer Bros.
Transfer and Piano Moving Company
(Schafer Bros.). The district received a site
assessment from the trusts, prior to closing,
that specified the existence of a waste pit
kept on the property by The Schafer Bros.
As a term of the sale, the district required the
trusts to put $250,000 in escrow to cover
the cost of the cleanup.
This money proved to be insufficient for
the cleanup, and the district brought an
action in federal court under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response Compen-
sation and Liability Act (CERCLA) to re-
cover the remaining funds. Both of the
primary defendants, the seller and the tenant
who polluted the land, settled with the dis-
trict, leaving only Mobil Oil Corp. and
Powerine Oil Co. (collectively M & P) as
parties to the suit. The district did not claim
that M & P contributed to the pollution on
the site. Rather the district claimed that since
M & P held easements across the land they
were automatically "owners" or "operators"
under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. The
court, holding for the defendants, rejected
this theory.
The case centered around the issue of
whether the holder of an easement crossing
a hazardous waste facility can be liable for
cleanup costs under CERCLA. To make
such a determination, the court examined
the standards for liability set out in the
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). This section
specifies, among other things, that the de-
fendant must fall with in one of four classes
of persons in order for there to be liability
under CERCLA. Of these classes, only two
are contested in this case: 1) present owners
and operators of a hazardous waste facility;
and 2) past owners or operators of such a
facility. The court, following precedent, ac-
knowledged Congress's intent to make "own-
ers" and "operators" two separate and dis-
tinct categories.
First, the court found that in certain cir-
cumstances the holder of an easement could
be an operator under CERCLA. This is
evidenced by the inclusion of pipelines in the
definition of "facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
The court makes clear, however, that merely
having a pipeline running across a hazard-
ous waste site is insufficient to establish
liability. To be an operator, the court ex-
plains, a party must take an active role in
running the facility. In addition, the facility
itself must be contributing to the hazardous
nature of the site. As easement holders, M &
P were simply exercising their right to have
their pipeline cross over the property. In this
context, the court concludes, they can not be
considered operators.
Second, since the term "owner" is not
specifically defined in the statutory language
of CERCLA, the court was forced to apply
general rules of statutory interpretation. The
court points to the circular nature of
CERCLA's definition of "owner or opera-
tor" as guidance in the instant decision. The
court stated that circularity "strongly im-
plied" the legislative intent to have the term
retain its common law definition. The com-
mon law did not regard easement holders as
owners of property. Instead, the easement
holder was said to have the mere use of
someone's land for a specific purpose. As
such, the court concluded that M & P did not
fall within the statutory meaning of the term
"owner."
In summarizing its decision, the court
looked at the public policy issues involved in
the case. The court noted that Congress
enacted CERCLA for the express purpose
of making polluters pay for the damage they
caused. Holding easement owners liable
would therefore only serve to destroy that
legislative intent and to increase the number
of future litigants. Since both these out-
comes would be undesirable, the court reaf-
firmed its holding as correct.
- by Greg Moldafsky
RCRA
City of Chicago v. EnvironmentalDefense
Fund, 114 S.Ct. 1588 (1994)
The city of Chicago (city) owned and
operated a municipal incineration facility
which generated ash known as municipal
waste combustion ash (MWC). The city then
disposed of this ash at landfills unlicensed for
the reception of hazardous waste. The Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund (EDF) brought a
citizen suit against the city and its mayor,
alleging these actions violated the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. § 6921(i). The city claimed that the
generated ash was exempt under RCRA
because the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) excluded household waste as
a hazardous waste under 40 C.F.R. §
261.4(b)(1).
The District Court agreed with the city
and granted its motion for summary judg-
ment. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit re-
versed, finding that the ash was subject to
hazardous waste regulation under Subtitle
C. While on a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, the EPA submitted a
memorandum which asserted the ash was
exempt under RCRA's Solid Waste Disposal
Act § 3001(i). The Supreme Court vacated
the lower court judgment and remanded to
the Seventh Circuit, which reinstated its
holding, finding that the plain language of
the statute did not exempt the ash which was
generated. The Supreme Court affirmed in
an opinion supported by seven justices.
RCRA contains regulations governing the
treatment of wastes from "cradle to grave."
Subtitle C applies to owners, operators,
generators and transporters of hazardous
waste, whereas subtitle D governs nonhaz-
ardous waste. The EPA determines which
wastes are hazardous and has specifically
excluded household waste.
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Although this incinerator burns house-
hold waste, it also bums nonhazardous in-
dustrial waste. Therefore, the MWC gener-
ated falls under subtitle C and must be
dumped at a landfill licensed for hazardous
waste. The Seventh Circuit detennined that
the household waste exemption only ap-
plied to the facility and not to the ash which
the facility generated and dumped at unli-
censed landfills. TheSeventh Circuitreached
its decision based on the plain meaning of
the statute which does not say that "gener-
ated" wastes are exempt. Therefore, if the
MWC ash generated by the facility was toxic,
the facility would be subject to subtitle C
regulations as a generator. However, the
more stringent regulations under subtitle C
for treatment, disposal and storage facilities,
would not apply.
- by Jill A. Morris
United States v. New Mexico, No. 92-
2275,1994 WL446769 (10th Cir. Aug. 18,
1994)
The Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL), owned by the Department of En-
ergy and operated by the Regents of the
University of Califonia, produced hazard-
ous and radioactive waste in the course of
the various research projects. LANL re-
ceived permits from the New Mexico Health
and Environment Department, which al-
lowed the center to operate an incinerator
for the disposal of its hazardous waste.
However, LANL also attempted to use its
incinerator to eliminate radioactive wastes in
violation of the conditions of its hazardous
waste facility permit.
In a declaratory judgment suit, the United
States claimed that because of sovereign
immunity, it was not bound by certain permit
terms. The United States argued that al-
though the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §.6961,
waived sovereign immunity in many cases,
New Mexico's conditions concerning radio-
active waste were not "requirements" as
defined by RCRA. The district court granted
New Mexico's motion for summary judg-
ment.
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed and held that the permit terms did fall
under RCRA § 6001, thus waiving sover-
eign immunity. The court based its holding
first on the fact that absent an express
waiver, states cannot regulate the activities
of the federal government. The court found
that RCRA § 6001 expressly waived sover-
eign immunity and required federal compli-
ance with "[sltate, interstate, and local re-
quirements, both substantive and proce-
dural."
The United States tried to show that since
New Mexico had not established any state
guidelines for radioactive waste, either in
statute or regulation, that portion of the
permit did not represent a RCRA require-
ment. The court determined that the defini-
tion of requirement should be construed
broadly to include both substantive stan-
dards and the procedural method of enforc-
ing those standards. In this case, the court
reasoned that in New Mexico's overarching
goal of hazardous waste regulation, a proce-
dural means of accomplishing that goal was
issuing a permit that prevented LANL from
burning its radioactive waste.
The court also examined the United States'
argument that the specific conditions con-
cerning incinerator monitoring for radioac-
tive exhaust were unworkable. It found that
the conditions were in fact workable, in that
determining the maximum exhaust mea-
surement required only a comparison be-
tween the level of radiation detected when
the incinerator was operating with and with-
out waste present.
The court also noted the minimal nature
of the standard and the existence of "time-
to-time" background checks on the level of
radioactivity. It found that this indicated
radioactive exhaust was not an area in which
New Mexico was regulating by specific state
guidelines, but was instead taking it into
consideration in its efforts to meet standards
set by the New Mexico Hazardous Waste
Act, N.M.Stat.Ann §§ 74-4-1 to 74-4-14.
- by Sarah Madden
United States v. Wagner, 29 F.3d 26447th
Cir.1994)
The defendants, Wolfgang Wagner and
Photo-cut, Inc., were charged and convicted
with two counts of violating the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). In
particular the defendants were guilty of un-
lawful storage of hazardous waste without a
permit and unlawful disposal of hazardous
waste pursuantto 42 U.S.C. § 6298(d)(2)(A).
The defendants appealed on the grounds
that the government failed to prove the
defendants had knowledge that a permit was
required and that there was insufficient evi-
dence for a conviction.
The defendants operated a photo etching
business, a process which involves the use of
ferric chloride. The business never obtained
a permit to store or dispose of the spent
ferric chloride which is a regulated hazard-
ous waste. A search warrant produced more
than 150 50-gallon drums of the waste
material located on the premises. The defen-
dants argued that a conviction for the viola-
tion of § 6928(d)(2)(A) requires the govem-
ment to prove that the defendants had
knowledge of the permit requirement. Upon
a literal reading of the statute, the court
found that the omission of the word "know-
ingly" with regard to the permit requirement
language does not suggest it should apply,
rather knowledge of the permit requirement
is not an element of the violation. The
Fourth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
have also so held concerning this particular
statutory violation.
The court quoted a Third Circuit case,
stating that "[tihe jury is free to infer knowl-
edge on the part of a management level
employee in a highly regulated area involv-
ing hazardous waste." United States v.
Johnson and Towers, 741 F.2d 662, 668
(3rd Cir. 1984).
Regarding the sufficiency of evidence
argument, the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the government, placing
the -burden on the defendant. The court
upheld the decision of the lower court be-
cause the conviction must be upheld if any
rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt The court found that the
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government proved abandonment of the
hazardous waste beyond a reasonable doubt
in light of the fact that no arrangements were
made to dispose of the waste, and that there
was evidence that the defendants knew the
waste remained at the facility.
- by Tracy Warren
CLEAN AIR ACT
Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton
Hudson Village, 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir.
1994)
The plaintiffs, Village of Oconomowoc
Lake, sought to prevent the defendants,
Dayton Hudson, from constructing a ware-
house near them. Plaintiffs filed suit under
the Clean Air Act (CAA) and Clean Water
Act (CWA). The suit was dismissed by the
United States District Court for the Eastern
District and the plaintiffs appealed.
The plaintiffs were concerned that the
vehicles coming to and from the warehouse
would pollute the air through emissions of
nitrogen oxides and other gases. Also, the
plaintiffs feared their groundwater would be
contaminated by oil dripping from the ve-
hicles which would run off the pavement
during storms, collect in a retention pond,
and seep into the ground. The plaintiffs sued
under the CAA which requires a permit for
the construction of a "major emitting facil-
ity." The plaintiffs opted to avoid the general
rule that persons suing under the CAA must
give 60 days notice to the potential defen-
dant. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b). Instead, the
plaintiffs sued under § 7604(a)(3) which
permits a citizen to file an action against one
proposing to construct a major emitting
facility without a permit. This particular
section does not contain the notice require-
ment. If they had given the proper notice,
they could have used § 7604(aXl), which
permits a citizen to file an action against one
in violation of an emission standard or
limitation set by the Act or the State, thus
avoiding the "major emitting facility" ob-
stacle.
The Court held that the warehouse would
not be considered a "major emitting facility"
pursuant to the CAA because the building
itself does not emit pollutants. In addition,
the court held that motor vehicles were not
considered "stationary sources" under the
CAA, and further that emissions from motor
vehicles are not attributable to the stationary
sources which serve as points of origin or
distribution.
With respect to the retention pond on the
defendant's premises, the court held that
neither the regulations of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) nor the provisions
of the CWA apply to ground waters. At this
time the definition of "waters of the United
States" does not include ground waters.
Although the EPA's definition of such wa-
ters includes "natural ponds," in this case the
defendants retention pond was an artificial
pond. Therefore, the federal government
does not have authority over artificial ponds,
such as the one in this case, that ultimately
drain into ground waters.
- by Tracy Warren
Madison Gas & Electric Company v.
Environmental Potection Agency, 25 F.3d
526 (7th Cir. 1994)
Title IV of the Clean Air Act (CAA) deals
with the problem of acid rain. Pursuant to
the CAA, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) must allocate emission allow-
ances to each of the nation's 2,200 electric
utilities, effective in the year 2000. Madison
Gas and Electric company and the City of
Springfield, Illinois, City Water, Light and
Power did not agree with the amount of
allowances given to them by the EPA.
The Plaintiff, Madison Gas & Electric,
argued that it should receive bonus allow-
ancesbecauseunder42U.S.C.§7651d(cXl)
and (c)(4), they are a company whose aggre-
gate capacity exceeds 250 megawatts. This
determination depends on whether such
capacity includes two electric companies of
which plaintiff owns 22 percent. The EPA
gave only threadbare reasons for the rejec-
tion of the plaintiff's request for additional
allowances. The EPA read the ambiguous
statutory language to mean that the capacity
referred to includes that capacity operated,
not owned. The court held that the reasons
given by the EPA were insufficient. Because
the statute is ambiguous, the court held that
it would not be unworkable to reallocate or
give bonus allowances on the basis of capac-
ity owned. The EPA can also require owner-
ship verification if it wishes.
The EPA also argued that the operating
company rather than the owner has a greater
need for the allowances, however, the court
held that this was not an issue because the
penalty provisions refer to liability with re-
spect to the "owner or operator." 42 U.S.C.
§ 76510).
The plaintiff asked the EPA to consider its
"generating capacity" according to the "sum-
mer net dependable capability," rather than
the "nameplate capacity." Using the former
would qualify the plaintiff as a company
operating at greater than 250 megawatts
which would afford the plaintiff more allow-
ances. The EPA chose to use the "name-
plate capacity" for reasons considered inad-
equate by this court. The court noted that the
EPA must fumish a satisfactory explanation
for its action, including a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice
made. The court held that simply because
prior sections specify "nameplate capacity",
it does not mean that a section referring to
"generating capacity" refers to "nameplate
capacity." Conversely, the use of a different
'term implies that a different meaning ac-
companies the term. The EPA did not give
sufficient grounds for its action, therefore,
the plaintiff's claims were granted review.
- by Tracy Warren
Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., No. 93-
2238,1994 WL443706 (10thCir. Aug. 17,
1994)
The New Mexico Environmental Depart-
ment (NMED) brought suit against Roswell
Tower, Inc., Ray Bell, and Leonard Talbert
in state court for violations of the New
Mexico Environmental Improvement Act.
The state court entered judgment for NMED
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and the defendants appealed. While the
appeal was pending, NMED filed suit in
federal court for violations of the Clean Air
Act (CAA). The District Court dismissed the
suit, holding NMED could not seek the
federal penalties provided by the CAA and
was thus precludedfrom bringing the federal
suit.
Under the CAA, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) establishes national air
quality standards, but each state has the
authority to implement its own procedures
to maintain these standards. Each state's
implementation plan has the force and effect
of federal law, giving the EPA the authority
to enforce the plan in federal court.
On appeal, NMED argued that the CAA
delegates broad authority to states with
implementation plans to enforce federal
causes of action. However, the court inter-
preted the CAA's language to mean that a
state with a federally approved implementa-
tion plan may enforce that plan "through the
state administrative and judicial process," or
through citizens' suits. The court examined
the procedures that must occur before the
EPA files suit to enforce the plan and found
no authority for a state to bring a federal
action for the penalties provided by CAA.
The court also looked to other parts of the
statute to support its conclusion that a state
could not bring an action for damages in
federal court. A state has the authority to
implement a penalty assessment and collec-
tion plan. However, the EPA has the power
to assess a penalty should the state not
assess a penalty. According to the court, the
dual authority over the assessment issue
demonstrates that the federal action acts as
an enforcement backup to be used only
when the state has not enforced its plan in
accordance with the CAA.
In another section of the CAA, Congress
provided for federal preemption only when
the state regulation is less stringent than
CAA's standards. Therefore, because a state
may implement procedures not required by
the CAA, the state action has independent
jurisdictional grounds and federal enforce-
ment will not be required. The federal action
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is a separate cause of action that cannot be
brought by a state.
- by Stephen B. Maule
McMarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363 (9th
Cir. 1994)
Citizens brought suit against the cities of
Tucson and Phoenix for injunctive relief
requiring the cities to comply with mass
transit proposals submitted to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) under the
CleanAirAct(CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2).
The District Court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendants, and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
The CAA requires that the EPA deter-
mine national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS) for specific pollutants. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409. The state then submits a plan to
implement and enforce the NAAQS to the
EPA, and upon approval this plan becomes
the "state implementation plan" (SIP). 42
U.S.C. § 7410. If an area does not meet the
NAAQS for a certain pollutant after the
approval of the SIP, the EPA labels it a
"nonattainment area."
The EPA declared certain portions of
Tucson and Phoenix (Pima and Maricopa
County) as nonattainment areas for Carbon
Monoxide (CO). Arizona's SIP revisions pro-
posed that these two cities would enlarge
their mass transit systems in order to comply
with the NAAQS. In 1982, the EPA condi-
tionally approved the Pima County SIP but
formally approved the Pima Improvement
Schedule which specifically outlined the mass
transit improvements. In addition, the EPA
conditionally approved the SIP revision for
Maricopa County in 1982. The condition for
these approvals was that certain deficiencies
unrelated to mass transit would be corrected.
The EPA formally disapproved the attain-
ment demonstrations in 1986 because Ari-
zona failed to correct the SIP's for Pima and
Maricopa Counties. In the same notice, the
EPA approved the mass transit measures.
After Arizona submitted acceptable propos-
als for-the attainment of NAAQS for CO, the
EPA approved them in 1988.
Upon review, Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that the EPA must promulgate
a federal implementation plan (FIP) since
Arizona's plan would not meet the NAAQS
in a timely manner to comply with the CAA.
Although the EPA created a FIP, it allegedly
reapproved the state measures which it had
approved prior to the Ninth Circuit decision.
The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's
suit to implement the previous mass transit
provisions, reasoning that an SIP or FIP is
only approved and applicable to a state if the
EPA specifically includes it in a final set of
documents. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the EPA meant to leave in
place the former approved measures be-
cause it did not delete the measures by
amending the Code of Federal Regulations.
The Court of Appeals supported its hold-
ing with the reasoning inKamp v. Hemandez
752 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir), which recognized
that the EPA can approve a substantially
complete plan and can comply with the
CAA by approving the SIP in increments.
The court compared the 1982 conditional
approvals to theKamp issue, reasoning that
the EPA properly approved the plans be-
cause they were substantially complete and
therefore binding on the cities as part of the
state's SIP.
In addition, the EPA argued that prior to
1990 it interpreted the CAA such that plans
which were conditionally approved become
part of the SIP. The court chose to give
deference to the EPA's interpretation. Fur-
thermore, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 instructed that
the EPA could approve a portion of any
submitted plan and was not necessarily
required to create an FIP. The court also
adopted appellants' assertion that SIP revi-
sions constitute additions rather than substi-
tutions for the existing SIP. It stated that the
District Court's interpretation could create a
counterproductive result. Furthermore, the
court found its decision supported by cases
in other circuits.
The cities asserted several arguments
which did not persuade the court. Namely,
they argued that this court's factual state-
ments in a prior suit, Arizona v. Thomas,
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829 F.2d at 834, prevented enforceability of
the mass transit provisions. The court re-
jected this assertion as being too broad of a
reading, and the court determined that the
cities could no longer challenge the ad-
equacy of Arizona's earlier submissions.
Finally, the court rejected the claim that its
interpretation created excessive confusion
because the enforceable portions of the SIP
are easily attainable by referring to the Fed-
eral Register.
The court held that the mass transit pro-
visions were incorporated into the SIP in
1982 and were subsequently reapproved by
the 1991 documents, thusTucson and Phoe-
nix are bound by these provisions. In addi-
tion, the court declined to design a remedy
and remanded the case instructing the Dis-
trict Court to grant the appellants' request
for summary judgment and injunctive relief.
- by Jill A. Monis
CLEAN WATER ACT
Alaska SportFishingAssociation v. Exxon
Corporation, No. 93-35852, 1994 WL
450327 (9th Cir. July 13, 1994)
The Alaska Sportfishing Association and
four individual sportfishers (plaintiffs) filed
suit in June 1989 against Exxon Corpora-
tion seeking injunctive relief and monetary
damages resulting from the 1989 Exxon
Valdez oil spill. Plaintiffs based their suit on
negligence, nuisance, and violation of an
Alaska statue imposing strict liability for
release of hazardous substances. Plaintiffs
consolidated this action with a similar suit
brought by the National Wildlife Federation
and other environmental groups. Exxon sub-
sequently removed the consolidated action
to federal court.
The United States and the state of Alaska
(governments) filed suit against Exxon in
March 1991 as "trustees for the public"
under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).
This suit claimed damages to restore the
environment and to compensate the govern-
ments for the loss of natural resources.
Exxon entered into a consent decree with
both governments in which Exxon agreed to
pay at least $900 million for environmental
damages. The governments thereby released
Exxon from any further civil litigation con-
ceming damages for the loss of natural
resources.
In 1992, Exxon moved for summary
judgment, claiming the consent decree it
entered into with the governments pre-
cluded the plaintiffs' claims for damages
regarding loss and use of natural resources.
The district court granted Exxon's motion
for two reasons: (1) the plaintiffs were in
privity with the governments; and (2) res
judicata prevented further claims for public
relief.
Plaintiffs raised two issues on appeal.
First, plaintiffs claimed that Department of
Interior (DOI) regulations under CERCLA
mandate recovery by trustees only for "re-
sidual" resource injury and not for public loss
of use and enjoyment that occurs prior to
"recovery" or cleanup. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals relied on case law and the
DOI regulations in denying plaintiffs' argu-
ment. The court held that, as trustees, the
governments were entitled to recover for all
lost-use damages on behalf of the public.
Plaintiffs next argued the district court
should not have relied on res judicata in
dismissing their complaint. In affirming the
district court's ruling that the consent decree
and Exxon settlement barred plaintiffs' claims
concerning lost recreational use on behalf of
the public, the court relied on the privity of
the parties and the identity of the issues.
First, the court found that the "parens
patriae" doctrine permitted Alaska to re-
cover damages for an injury to its sovereign
interest. Alaska had an interest in protecting
its natural resources, and it was the oil spill
that injured these natural resources. Further-
more, the "parens patriae" doctrine pre-
sumes a state will adequately protect the
interests of its citizens in a suit to protect its
sovereignty. Thus, the plaintiffs' interests
were adequately represented by the govem-
ments in the consent decree and they were
"parties" to the decree for res judicata pur-
poses.
Second, the court held that since the
governments had authority to recover for
pre-cleanup lost uses, any claims regarding
loss of use before cleanup had been covered
in the consent decree. Moreover, the court
affirmed the district court's ruling that the
only causes of action that could now be
brought were "uniquely private" tort claims.
Once again, the court relied on the fact that
the governments had already brought these
claims and the plaintiffs' interests were ad-
equately represented by the governments.
- by Stephen B. Maule
P.U.D. No. 1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Department of Ecology, 114
S. Ct. 1900 (1994)
A public utility district (P.U.D.) wanted a
permit to build a hydroelectric project on the
Dosewallips River. The Washington State
Environmental Agency conditioned the
project's permit on a given minimum flow
rate of water for the dam. A state administra-
tive appeals board determined that the mini-
mum flow requirement was intended to
enhance, not merely maintain, a down-
stream fishery, and that the certification
condition therefore exceeded the
Department's authority under state law. On
appeal, theWashingtonStateSuperiorCourt
held that respondent had imposed the mini-
mum flow requirement to protect and pre-
serve the fishery, not to improve it. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the
decision, holding that the minimum flow
requirement was a permissible condition of
a 33 U.S.C. § 1341 certification under the
Clean Water Act (CWA).
The CWA requires developers to get a
certification from the state showing that any
"discharge" will comply with provisions of
the AcL P.U.D. contended that the word
"discharge," as used in § 1341(a), refers only
to materials added to the water, and that this
definition would not include a reduction in
stream flow. The Supreme Court agreed
with this definition, but held that the broad
enabling provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d)
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allow the state to ensure that the project
complies with "any other appropriate re-
quirements of State law" once the threshold
condition, the existence of any discharge, is
satisfied. In this case, the state asserted that
the minimum stream flow requirement was
imposed to ensure compliance with the state
water quality standards adopted pursuant to
the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
P.U.D. asserted that § 1313 requires the
state to protect designated "uses" solely
through implementation of specific and ob-
jective numerical "criteria." The Court
adopted a literal interpretation of §
1313(c)(2)(A)suchthat,bydefinition, aproject
that does not comply with a designated use
of the water does not comply with the
applicable water quality standards. In its
holding, the court referenced typical state
and EPA water quality standards which
include a number of open-ended require-
ments, including aesthetic considerations.
P.U.D.'s assertion that the CWA only
regulates water "quality" and not water "quan-
tity" was dismissed as an artificial distinction.
Also dismissed was the contention that wa-
ter quantity was specifically excluded from
the coverage of the act. Since the CWA gave
the states authority to allocate water rights,
the Court found it peculiarthat P.U.D. would
argue that the Act prevents the State from
regulating stream flow.
Finally, P.U.D. argued that the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has
sole authority to regulate transmission of
waterpower through streams. The court
found no conflict with FERC licensing activ-
ity, stating that "it is quite possible ... that any
FERC license would contain the same con-
ditions as the State § 1341 certification."
The Court noted that FERC was repre-
sented in the earlier proceedings, and had
expressed no objection to the stream flow
condition.
- by Kin Semsch
8TH CIRCUIT
Sargent Construction Company, Inc. v.
State Auto Insurance Company, 23 F.3d
1324 (8th Cir. 1994)
While working at a construction site for
Town and Country Supermarkets (T & C),
Sargent Construction Company, Inc.
(Sargent) needed to level a concrete floor.
Sargent etched the floor with acid to make
the surface suitable to apply a product called
Flo-Top. Because fumes from the acid re-
acted with the chrome portions of various
objects at the site, approximately $75,000
in damages occurred to fixtures owned by T
& C.
Sargent submitted a claim to its insurer,
State Auto Insurance Company (State Auto),
but State Auto denied coverage based on a
pollution exclusion contained in the policy.
While the policy covered bodily injury and
property damage, if the injury or damage
resulted from "the actual, alleged or threat-
ened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migra-
tion, release or escape of pollutants," the
policy did not apply.
State Auto moved for summary judgment
in district court, claiming the policy specifi-
cally defined "pollutant," and the acid Sargent
used to etch the floor fell under this defini-
tion. Sargent claimed the common practice
in the construction industry was to not treat
the acid used as a "pollutant." The district
court granted State Auto's summary judg-
ment motion, relying on the dear and unam-
biguous nature of the pollution exclusion
clause.
On appeal, Sargent argued that general
issues of material fact existed as to whether
the acid involved was a "pollutant." Relying
on Missouri law, the Court of Appeals re-
garded the policy as a contract and applied
the rules of contract construction. Thus, if
the policy contains ambiguous terms, the
terms must be construed against the insurer
as the drafter of the policy. Moreover, inter-
preting the meaning of an ambiguous term
requires examining both its technical mean-
ing and the average layperson's meaning.
However, when a conflict arises, the
layperson's definition will be applied unless
clear intent in the policy indicates otherwise.
The court then examined the definition
used in the policy and held that whether or
not "pollutant" covers a particular substance
depended on the phrase "irritant or contami-
nant." Since "irritant or contaminant" could
mean either already caused a physical irrita-
tion or may cause a physical irritation in the
future, the court found the policy's definition
of "pollutant" ambiguous. Thus, the court
held that the district court had erred in
granting summary judgment and remanded
the case for further proceedings in light of
the appellate court's construction of the
policy.
- by Stephen B. Maule
State of Nebraska v. Rural Electrification
Administration, 23 F.3d 1336 (8th Gr.
1994)
The State of Nebraska filed a petition to
prohibit the Platte River Whooping Crane
Maintenance Trust from participating in
various environmental litigation. The district
court found that the Trustees were acting
within their designated rights under the trust
instrument, and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.
After environmental litigation between
the State of Nebraska and the Basin Electric
Power Cooperative of Bismarck, North Da-
kota, in 1978, a settlement agreement es-
tablished the Platte River Whooping Crane
Maintenance Trust (Trust). The purpose of
the Trust is to protect and maintain the
migratory bird habitat located in the Big
Bend area of the Platte River between
Overtonand Chapman, Nebraska. TheTrust
obtained title to 7,000 acres and has ease-
ments over an additional 1,600 acres of land
in the area. The Trustees' duties include
management of the critical crane habitat, the
acquisition of land or interests in land, con-
ducting of scientific research of various crane
habitat, and acquisition of all types of rights
in or to water or water storage. However, the
Trust agreement prohibits the Trustees from
using propaganda to influence legislation,
participating in any political campaign, or
becoming involved in "any litigation other
than litigation directly related to the admin-
istration of the Trust." Trust Declaration, §
IV(C)(2).
After two com growers associations in-
formed of possible violations of the Trust
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Declaration, the Attorney General of Ne-
braska investigated the matter and con-
cluded that the Trust's intervention in the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) relicensing proceedings for Kingsley
Dam and North Platte/Keystone Diversion
Dam Project, and its participation in a suit
filed by Nebraska to enforce an earlier North
Platte decree violated the Trust Declaration.
The State of Nebraska filed a petition in
district court seeking interpretation of the
Trust Declaration which would prohibit the
Trust from participating in the litigation.
First, the State of Nebraska argued that
the participation violated the Declaration
because the Trustees were trying to enhance
water flows by engaging in "aggressive,
policy-oriented litigation." The District Court
and the Court of Appeals found that the
participation in the litigation directly relates
to the supply of water flowing to the critical
crane habitat and the distinction between
participation in such litigation and aggres-
sively seeking such litigation is one without
merit.
Second, the State asserted that the Trust's
participation in relicensing proceedings were
against the Trust's declaration. The Trust
petitioned the FERC to implement environ-
mental protection conditions upon two
projects receiving interim annual licenses.
These conditions would bring the two hydro-
electric projects within compliance of federal
environmental laws, including the Endan-
gered Species Act and the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, which would secure adequate
stream flows into the Big Bend area. The
Trust was concerned with the power dis-
tricts' practice of blocking water flow through
the dams at various times during the year
which results in de-watering of portions of
the Platte River. This lack of water causes
the degradation of the Platte River migratory
bird. A condition to relicensing would in-
clude minimum instream flows of water
throughout the year. The court found that
the participation in the relicensing proceed-
ings directly related to the critical habitat of
the Big Bend area of the Platte River and
thus was not in violation of the Trust Decla-
ration.
Second, the State focused on the partici-
pation by the Trust as amicus curiae in
Nebraska v. Wyoming. The litigation in-
volves the allocation of water rights among
Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado. Al-
though the scope is broad and other forums
exist for the Trust to present its concerns,
the court found that the Trust focused on the
properly restricted goal of preserving the
migratory bird. The court held that the
Trust's efforts to secure water flows to the
Big Bend area of the Platte River are directly
related to its mandate under the Trust agree-
ment.
Third, the State argued that the Trust's
participation in litigation should be limited to
the water lost to the Grayrocks Hydroelectric
project, which was the subject of litigation
when the Trust was created. The court
found that the purpose of the Trust was to
protect and maintain the hydrological and
biological integrity of the area for the Whoop-
ing Crane and other migratory species. This
language clearly authorizes the Trust to
participate in litigation that affects the Trust's
purpose and is not limited to the Grayrocks
project.
Fourth, the State asserted that the Trust
may not litigate against a position taken by
the State because the Trust Declaration
mandates the Trust to operate exclusively in
connection with the State's purpose. How-
ever, the ultimate goal of the Trust is to
further projects protecting and maintaining
Big Bend habitat. The Court held that the
State's only remedy when it disagrees with
the Trust is to remove its appointed Trustee.
- by Jackie Hamra
United States v. IC Freeman., No. 93-
3899, 1994 WL 393426 (8th Cir. Aug. 1,
1994)
The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri convicted Will-
iam K. Freeman (Freeman) of illegally trans-
porting and storing hazardous waste without
apermitinviolationof42 U.S.C.§6928(dX1)
and (dX2XA). During the sentencing, the
District Court added to his base offense level
pursuanttoU.S.S.G. §§2Q1.2(bX1XB)which
resulted in an enhanced sentence. Freeman
appealed the addition to his base offense
level to the United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, which affirmed his sentence.
In his capacity as vice president of a
corporation that manufactures automobile
parts, Freeman instructed employees to store
drums of hazardous waste in the corporation's
leased storage space. Through delegated
duties, two different employees eventually
transported the drums to the storage facility.
Subsequently, Freeman and his codefen-
dant acquired ownership of the corporation.
At some point thereafter, the Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) inspected the cor-
poration and found the drums were leaking
the hazardous waste on the storage room
floor. Freeman was subsequently convicted
of illegally transporting and storing hazard-
ous waste without a permit.
Freeman did not appeal his conviction but
appealed the addition of four levels to his
base offense level. U.S.S.G § 2Q1.2(a) sets
the base offense level at eight and § 2Q1.2(b)
provides for increases in this level for certain
offense characteristics. The base level can
be increased by six for ongoing or repetitive
discharges into the environment and by four
if it otherwise involved discharge of hazard-
ous substances.
Freeman claimed that these levels cannot
be added because he was acquitted of dis-
charging toxic substances. However, the
court found that the standard for adding
levels to the base offense level is lower than
that for a conviction of discharging toxic
substances, and thus the additions can be
madewithoutaconviction.Thecourtpointed
out that the government was able to prove a
discharge and thus the additional levels were
justified.
Freeman's appeal also addressed whether
there was a lack of proof that the discharge
actuallycontaminated the environment. Free-
man asserted that the government lacked
any evidence of actual environmental con-
tamination. The court noted that while §
2Q1.2(bX1XA) requires that the waste be
discharged into the environment, §
2Q1.2(bX1X)B) does not have such a require-
ment. However, the court avoided address-
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ing this distinction by showing that the
environment was contaminated by the leak-
age. The court cited United States v. Ferrin,
994 F.2d 658, 662-64 (9th Cir. 1993),
explaining that the volatile state of the waste
caused the air to carry its organic com-
pounds to be carried into the air, thus
contaminating the environment The court
also noted that the storage facility had a drain
that led to a sewer and into a creek.
Freeman also appealed the increase in his
base offense level for organizing five or more
people in criminal activity pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). He cited the require-
ments of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D) in point-
ing out that the court never made a finding
about the number of people or his role in the
offense. The court found that Freeman failed
to object to the presentence report (PSR),
which adequately set out seven people in-
volved in the crime and Freeman's role in
organizing these people, and thus there was
no need for a finding. This, according to the
court, satisfies Rule 32(c)(3)(D).
Instead of objecting to the PSR, Freeman
stated that § 311.1 does not apply because
he was acquitted of conspiring to store and
transport hazardous wastes illegally. Once
again, the court found that acquittal, in this
case for conspiracy to store and transport
hazardous waste, does not preclude an in-
crease in his base offense level and overruled
Freeman's § 3B1.1(a) objection.
- by Joe Hewes
Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th
Cir. 1994)
The Sierra Club and other environmental
organizations (Sierra Club) brought an action
challenging the land and resource manage-
ment plan of a national forest. In particular,
Sierra Club wanted to bar the Forest Service
(FS) from proceeding with two timber sales
in the Ouachita National Forest. Pursuant to
the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA), the Secretary of Agriculture is au-
thorized to develop, maintain, and revise a
land andTesource management plan (.RMP)
to beusedby the FS inits maintenance of the
units of the National Forest Service. 16
178
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992). Through this Act, national forests are
authorized for their variety of uses. This plan
must be developed to comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
which requires that an environmental im-
pact statement (EIS) be conducted which
outlines Federal activities affecting the qual-
ity of the environment accompany the plan.
The plan is established in a two step
process. The first step requires a team under
the command of the Forest Service to de-
velop a proposed plan and EIS. 36 C.F.R §
219.10(a)-(b). This proposed plan is re-
viewed by the Regional Forester and is either
approved or disapproved. During the sec-
ond stage, individual site specific projects
are proposed and assessed under the plan.
The Forest Service is responsible for ensur-
ing that all projects are consistent with the
plan. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
In 1986 an LRMP and EIS were issued for
the Ouachita National Forest which con-
tained thirteen alternative management sce-
narios. An alternative was selected in March
of 1990. Later, an independent EIS regard-
ing the vegetation management in the Ozark,
St. Francis, and Ouachita Mountains was
drafted and accompanied the plan. In addi-
tion, a vegetation management program
pursuant to a record of decision amended
the plan's approach to herbicide use.
Sierra Club filed an administrative appeal
regarding these decisions. In April of 1991,
the Sierra Club brought suit in the District
Court for the Westem District of Arkansas
claiming that the plan violated governing
statutes and regulations. The Forest Service
issued two Decision Notices, one in 1988
for the Oden region and one in 1990 for the
Choctaw region, stating that the plan com-
plied with all applicable law.
In July of 1991, Sierra Club sought a
preliminary injunction barring the Forest
Service from proceeding with the Oden and
Choctaw sales, claiming that they were
denied their right to administrative review.
The District Court found that they had been
provided with written notice of the decision,
were given the requisite forty-five days to
appeal, and because of Sierra Club's failure
to appeal their request was denied. The
court also noted that Environmental Assess-
ment Supplements were not appealable de-
cisions.
Sierra Club again requested a preliminary
injunction, this time alleging that the timber
sales violated the statutes governing the
plan, and that the FS decisions were arbi-
trary and capricious. The District Court
denied this request, stating that the Sierra
Club had forfeited all of its challenges to the
Oden sales and all but one of its challenges
to the Choctaw sales by failing to exhaust its
administrative remedies. The court also made
an alternative decision, and held on the
merits that the Forest Service had not acted
arbitrarily or capriciously.
Next Sierra Club sought judicial review of
the plan under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988), arguing
mainly that the plan violated NFMA and
NEPA. After allowing several parties to
intervene, the Forest Service's motion for
summary judgment was granted. On the
same day this motion was granted, the court
denied Sierra Club's motion for leave of
-court to file a second supplemental com-
plaint.
Sierra Club appealed the denial of its
motions for preliminary injunctions and the
court's denial of its motion for leave to file a
second supplemental complaint. The court
noted that in its brief, Sierra Club essentially
abandoned its site specific objections, and
instead focused its complaints on the plan
violating the governing statutes. However,
this court did review the District Court's
rulings as they relate to the specific timber
sales.
This court made quick work of Sierra
Club's appeal of the court's denial of prelimi-
nary injunctions. The court held that no error
of law appeared, and that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the
injunctions.
The important holding in this case was
that Sierra Club lacked standing to challenge
the plan. The court based its standing analy-
sis on the element that the plaintiff must
suffer an "injury in fact." The court did not
deny that complaints of environmental and
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aesthetic harms can be sufficient to confer
standing, but concluded that Sierra Club
failed to assert an injury that is certain to
occur. Furthermore, the plan by itself is just
a means of achieving environmental change,
and that finding injury due merely to the
existence of the plan without reference to a
site-specific action is pure speculation.
It was noted that the Supreme Court has
not addressed the issue of whether plaintiffs
challenging a forest plan have standing, but
that that Court has required an injury with a
high degree of immediacy. Specifically, in
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497
U.S. 871 (1990), the Supreme Court denied
standing where plaintiffs challenged the pro-
priety of a program used to classify and
administer public lands.
Referring to Lujan, the court held that if
this was a site-specific action, and all admin-
istrative appeals had been exhausted, per-
sons threatened by imminent injury in fact
could seek judicial review of the proposed
action. Such persons could allege that the
proposed action is not consistent with the
plan, or that the plan violated the governing
statutes.
Conceding that the standing issue was a
close call, the court therefore addressed the
District Court's granting of summary judg-
ment to appellees. After a de novo review,
the court held that the District Court had
applied the correct standard: the deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard of the
Administrative Procedures Act. This court
fully agreed with the District Court's findings
that the plan is not arbitrary or capricious,
and that it comports with the governing
statutes and regulations. The court also held
that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for leave of
court to file a second supplemental com-
plaint.
- C. Todd Ahrens
NEPA, ESA, AND
BANKRUPTCY
Sahnon River Concerned Citizens, et al.
v. Dale Robertson, et al.
No. 92-16113, 1994 WL 314807 (9th Cir.
Oct. 4, 1993)
Salmon River Concerned Citizens (SRCC)
formed to prevent the National Forest Ser-
vice from implementing its plan to control
vegetation in the Pacific Southwest Region
(Region Five). The proposed plan, in part,
consisted of an environmental impact state-
ment required by the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA). 42 U.S.C. § 4332. As
basis for its suit, SRCC claimed that the
National Forest's environmental impactstate-
ment was insufficient in its examination of
several key issues.
The National Forest Management Act of
1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. § 1601, required
the Forest Service (FS) to improve resource
management by facilitating reforestation.
Since one method of reforestation, vegeta-
tion management, can involve the use of
various herbicides, NEPA required the Re-
gional Forester to revise Region Five's 1974
environmental impact statement to update
the potential effects of herbicides. The final
draft of the impact statement included an
analysis examining the worst case risks
associated with use of different herbicides.
From the possible management plans
outlines in the impact statement, the Re-
gional Forester chose one that provided an
amount of discretion in choosing the best
method of vegetation management for the
particular region. This approach included
approval of herbicide use when deemed
essential under the circumstances. SRCC
appealed the Record of Decision in an
administrative hearing and argued for a
partial stay of herbicide use while the appeal
was pending.
The FS formally approved the Regional
Forester's impact statement and choice of
specific plan for vegetation management. At
the same time, the Forest Service removed
both a temporary ban on the use of herbi-
cides in Region Five as well as the stay on
herbicide use. In light of SRCC's claim, it
further determined the Service's decision
was valid, as it was neither arbitrary nor
capricious.
SRCC then filed suit in the Federal District
Court against the Forest Service. The court
granted the Service's motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the impact state-
ment was sufficient in detail to meet the
NEPA standard. Both parties appealed: the
Defendants-Appellees, on the questions of
SRCC's legal standing and issue ripeness,
and Plaintiffs-Appellants, on the incomplete-
ness of the impact statement with regard to
herbicide use.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held the district court on all three issues. It
found that SRCC had sufficient legal stand-
ing to bring its claim, because the group met
requirements for both constitutional and
statutory standing in that its grievance
stemmed from a final agency action which
was of concrete interest to group members.
The court stated that the issue was ripe for
determination because although no herbi-
cide use had taken place, the future threat of
use mentioned in the impact statement
represented an addressable issue.
The Court of Appeals further held that the
impact statement was complete in its analy-
sis of herbicide use. The court stated its
standard of review was based Oregon Envtl.
Counsel v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d. 484, 491
(9th Cir. 1987), which held that the court can
not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency in question, as the agency has a
measure of expertise in the area which the
court lacks. The court also relied upon the
standard of review articulated in Sierra Club
v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 964 (5th Cir. 1983),
to determine whether or not the impact
statement was "'arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not accord-
ing to law."'
In its complaint, SRCC identified three
areas as being either absent or inadequate in
the impact statement. The first was the fact
that the impact statement failed to consider
the cumulative effect of herbicides in the
region, as it only examined the FS's use.
However, the court held that while the
impact statement did not identify every po-
tential herbicide user by name or amount,
the statement did call attention to the fact
that exposure from multiple sources was
possible. The impact statement accounted
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for cumulative effect, the court found, in the
statement's worst case risk analysis, which
based its assessment on the combination of
exposure to Forest Service herbicides in
conjunction with other "lifetime exposures."
SRCC also contended that the impact
statement did not explore the content and
potential effects of inert ingredients in the
herbicides. Based on its holding in North-
west Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides
v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 597-598 (9th Or.
1988), the court found a listing of inert
ingredients and potential effects was unnec-
essary. Instead, the court stated that main
ingredients, which were more likely to be
toxic than the inerts, should be the main
focus of the impact statement. Again, the
court pointed to the worst case risk assess-
ment as ensuring reasonable accuracy by
taking into account factors the impact state-
ment did not specifically address.
The court held SRCC's last claim was
likewise without merit. SRCC stated that the
impact statement lacked full evaluation of
the effect of herbicide use on individuals with
multiple chemical sensitivities syndrome. The
court reasoned that since this syndrome is
difficult to quantify or even accurately define,
the extent to which the impact statement
addressed the issue was sufficient. The im-
pact statement analyzed a potential range of
sensitivity to the herbicides with "margin of
safety factors," which the court found to be
accepted by the scientific community and
inclusive enough to account for the small
population of chemically sensitive people.
- by Sarah Madden
Pacific Northwest Generating Coopera-
tive v. Brown, 25 F.3d 1443 (9th Cir. 1994)
Plaintiffs Pacific Northwest Generating
Cooperative, Public Power Council, and
Aluminum Company of America and other
companies purchasing power from the
Bonneville Power Administration (Direct
Service Industries) challenged the response
of Defendants Ronald H. Brown, Secretary
of Commerce, and several other federal
defendants, including the Bonneville Power
Administration, to the listing of three species
of salmon as endangered or threatened
species on the Snake River. The response
challenged was an increase in the water flow
in the Columbia River system designed to
increase water spills at dams and to increase
the velocity of the river in order to benefit the
movement of the juveniles (young) of the
listed species by improving the speed and
success of the smelts' journeys downstream.
This response limited the use of water for
power production, resulting in an increase in
the cost of power supplied by the Bonneville
Power Administration.
The cases of the three separate plaintiffs
were consolidated and brought before the
United States District Court for the District of
Oregon. The plaintiffs brought several ac-
tions alleging violations of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §
1531 et seq., and the Administrative Proce-
dures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706(1988).The
district court held that all the plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring claims under the Endan-
gered Species Act, and in the alternative,
that the plaintiff's claims with respect to
defendants' failure to conduct habitat and
hatchery consultations in 1992 were moot.
The district court also rejected the claim of
the plaintiffs on the merits, that it is a
violation of the Endangered Species Act to
permit a taking of endangered species that
is "incidental" to a permitted activity, and
that this "incidental" taking allows the pro-
hibited trade or transportation of members
of endangered species to take place.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began
its analysis of the plaintiffs appeal with a
discussion of standing. The court noted that
the District Court properly considered
whether an interest worthy of standing exists
in this case is based on the elements set forth
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct.
2130, 2136 (1992). The three elements are:
1) an actual or imminent invasion of a
concrete and legally protected interest; 2) a
causal connection between that invasion or
injury and the conduct of the defendant; and
3) that it is likely, not speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable deci-
sion.
The District Court found that the plaintiff's
interest was in the water resource and not in
the endangered and threatened species.
Furthermore, the District Court held that the
plaintiffs did not establish causation because
even if the consultations and ban on taking
a listed species had occurred, the plaintiffs
failed to show how the listed species would
rebound to such an extent that water flow
increases were not necessary. Finally, the
District Court found that a bar on the takings
of the salmon would not necessarily take the
species off the list, and therefore redressability
was at best speculative.
The court held that the plaintiffs had what
is called "Footnote Seven Standing" pursu-
ant to Defenders, 112 S.Ct. at 2142, foot-
note seven. In Defenders. the court allowed
someone living adjacent to a proposed site
for a dam to have standing to challenge the
failure to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement, even though it was speculative
whether said statement would cause the
license to build the dam to be withheld. In the
instant case the court compared the plain-
tiffs to those in Defenders, in that they are
businesses who are affected by the alleged
failures of federal agencies under the ESA.
They cannot prove that a change in the
biological opinions would require the flow
rates imposed by the Bonneville Power
Administration to be altered or reduce the
costs involved in preserving the fish, but a
successful challenge might possibly impact
the conduct of agencies in the consultation
process. Furthermore, the court stated that
under the "Footnote Seven" rule, the plain-
tiffs in this case arguably need only to
establish causation or redressability as a
reasonable possibility. In concluding that the
plaintiffs have standing under the "Footnote
Seven" rule, the court had no difficulty in
converting the economic interests of the
plaintiffs, which were recognized by the
District Court, into a legal interest, and thus
standing was established.
The court went on to find that the plain-
tiffs' claims with respect to the failure of the
agencies to consider the impact on the
hatcheries, habitat and that the remainder of
comprehensive consultation claims were
moot. Finally, the court addressed the merits
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of the claim that the failure to address the
impact on harvest made the consultation not
comprehensive.
The plaintiffs argued that the ESA permits
takings of endangered species incidental to
a permitted activity due to the fact that the
fisheries cannot distinguish between listed
and non-listed species. This taking, in the
opinion of the plaintiffs, is not "incidental."
If these incidental takings were not allowed
then the species would not be endangered
and the increase water flow would be unnec-
essary. The court concluded that these tak-
ings are incidental and that even though the
Endangered Species Act prohibits the trans-
portation and trading of listed species, a
situation which would certainly occur with
respect to incidental takings, this would be
impossible to enforce. Thus the court con-
cluded that the harvesting claims were based
on a misinterpretation of the ESA, and
affirmed the grant of summary judgment to
all the defendants.
- by C. Todd Ahrens
In re C. Hanna v John Mitchell, Inc., 168
B.R. 386 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1994)
Gull Industries, Inc. (Gull) filed a complaint
in Daniel Hanna's (Hanna) bankruptcy for
injunctive relief and an administrative prior-
ity damage claim after discovering Hanna
was contaminating Gull's land through mi-
gration of substances. The bankruptcy court
found that Gull's costs to clean up the
property were pre-petition claims which are
not entitled the administrative expense sta-
tus. However, Gull was entitled to bring a
general unsecured claim against the bank-
ruptcy estate. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Hanna, and Gull owned adjacent filling
stations which leaked petroleum products
into the soil. Gull sold the property to BP Oil
Company whereby the sale agreement re-
quired Gull to clean up the environmental
damage to the site. Gull hired an environ-
mental consultant to inspect the site. The
specialist discovered that the groundwater
beneath the Gull site was contaminated by
migration from the polluted Hanna land.
Gull removed the material and in June of
1990, demanded that Hanna stop the flow
of contaminating substances which were
hampering his cleanup efforts. About a
week later, Hanna filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy and appointed John Mitchell,
Inc. (Mitchell) as Chapter 11 Trustee.
Gull filed a complaint seeking injunctive
relief and tort damages under Oregon Re-
vised Statute § 465.255, and requested
these expenses be considered administra-
tive expenses under 11 U.S.C. § 503. Al-
though Hanna emptied the leaking under-
ground storage tanks on Hanna's site and
removed them, he did not removethe under-
lying contaminated soil or perform a site
study as ordered by the bankruptcy court.
The bankruptcy court denied Gull's admin-
istrative claim but found that remedial action
costs were recoverable as a general unse-
cured claim under O.R.S. § 465.255. Gull
and Mitchell appealed the finding.
The court first addressed Gull's appeal for
denial of administrative status. The court
grants administrative status "only when a
claim is (1) incurred postpetition, (2) directly
and substantially benefits the estate, and (3)
is an actual and necessary expense." The
bankruptcy court found that the petroleum
leaks on the Hanna property occurred pre-
petition and that no significant contamina-
tion was added to the Hanna land
postpetition. However, the court also found
that the migration of contamination contin-
ued during the cleanup efforts. This incon-
sistency is explained by the court's citation
to earlier cases finding that once a pre-
petition triggering event has occurred, the
claim is dischargeable regardless of when
the claim is finally adjudicated. The bank-
ruptcy court identified the triggering event as
the petroleum spills from the underground
storage tanks into the soil which occurred
pre-petition. The Ninth Circuit agreed, find-
ing that pre-petition damages are not en-
titled to administrative expense priority.
Gull also argued that its claim should be an
allowed administrative expense as a matter
of environmental policy. However, the court
states that Congress alone sets priorities and
that courts are not given the right to create
priorities for environmental cleanup costs.
The Ninth Circuit held that the bankruptcy
court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Gull administrative expense status.
The court next discussed Mitchell's cross-
appeal allowing Gull's claim to be classified
as an unsecured claim under Oregon law.
Mitchell asserted that Gull failed to follow the
guidelines issued by the Oregon Department
of Environmental Equality (ODEQ) in its
cleanup efforts, and therefore Gull's claim
should not be allowed. Mitchell also claimed
that the court's altemative theory of liability
based on trespass is not lawful, but the court
did not address this theory affirmed solely on
the former theory.
Mitchell argued that a claim is only al-
lowed if it is consistent with a permanent,
remedial action as defined in the applicable
rules governing remedial actions in contain-
ing the gasoline plume pursuant to O.R.S. §
465.200(15). However, the definition of
remediation includes actions taken to re-
move or minimize the release of contamina-
tion so that it does not migrate to cause
substantial danger. The court found that
Gull's actions slowed the migration of the
contamination which appears to be "ac-
tions" in compliance with the statute. The
statute expressly states that the particular
actions of remediation listed are not exhaus-
tive. The court concluded that the action was
remedial under the statute and Gull is there-
fore entitled to a general unsecured claim.
- by Jackie Hamra
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